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“I shall sing no celebratory song!”​[1]​ Apparently, after more than fifty years of development co-operation this is how Philip Quarles van Ufford views the history of interventionism in the South since the idea of development emerged after World War II.​[2]​ “‘Something is rotten in the state of Development’ after more than fifty years of application”, he noted in a recent speech to Danish development researchers.​[3]​ Remarkably, those consistently expressed doubts on past efforts to transform society in the South through organized interventions, Quarles has in common with that other great critic of development co-operation, the late Prince Claus of the Netherlands; and with the latter he also shares the search for a new paradigm, based on the original pursuit of global responsibilities. This essay aims at an initial response to that quest. First I shall examine the critique, then go into the current mode of “human development” based on “human freedom”, and finally I shall try to lay certain foundations for an alternative paradigm. 

Indeed, in a speech on fifty years of Dutch development co-operation Prince Claus took a rather dim view at the period, emphasizing that any manifestation of euphoria would be misplaced.​[4]​ (Notably, his appearance at the actual gathering remained limited to the mere acceptance of a book, for the “simple” reason that the Netherlands minister for development co-operation refused to take any responsibility for his thoughts.) Among the indications pointing towards a less positive assessment Claus mentions the absolute increase in global poverty, the net flow of finance from South to North, the rise of political instability and intra-state collective violence, and the extraordinarily increasing inequality between and within countries: “After fifty years of development co-operation the world is more unequal than ever before.”   

Quarles’s rotten state appears to be a matter of substance as well as discourse. As he puts it bluntly: “What is ‘rotten’ and harmful is this strange combination of chaos and consistent denial of it.”​[5]​ In such expressions of displeasure with both the substance of development co-operation and its discourse and terminology, Quarles also had a strong ally in Prince Claus. Words like development, developing countries, third world, and even development co-operation, the latter stated in his unspoken speech, have become hollow and empty. He discerns four dimensions of a serious crisis in development theory. Firstly, a rather limited and orthodox economism prevails. Illustrative in this connection is an apparently unrestrained faith in market forces. However, fifty years of development co-operation have shown that markets cannot provide adequate answers to poverty, hunger, environmental degradation and international migration, while being insufficiently sensitive to the yearning for more equality and justice. Indeed, poor people deserve more than markets alone. Here we find a striking echo in Quarles’ plaintive observations on “the shift to the market” which “aims at transforming society as a whole into a ‘market society’”, adding that market thinking deeply penetrates the non-market sector, too: “Government departments, NGOs and private organizations active in the domains of development are required to operate as if they are businesses.”​[6]​ 

Prince Claus further expressed his concerns on a lack of cultural focus in development theories, an invalidated propensity towards generalization, and a foundation in principles based on the wrong questions. He noted an enormous need for new conceptual and analytical paradigmata that show a much greater sensitivity to issues connected with distribution of poverty as well as opportunities, both between and within nations. Here again we find strongly concurring views with Quarles’ emphasis on the need for a moral basis of development and for a paradigm for the Good.​[7]​ 

Indeed, the problem with “development” as a domain for policy interventions is that this widely used term is positively normative in its general connotation but without any substantive indication of what precisely would have to be improved or rather uplifted​[8]​. Thus, in the name of development, many interventions have taken place that, although perhaps beneficial to the intervener, turned out to be highly negative for those in whose lives the actual interference took place.

When, with the birth of the United Nations in 1945, development became an international venture, its first interpretation was predominantly economic: uplifting a country’s economic structure (its productive potential in relation to its people’s needs). A principal problem here is that this norm is macro-economic, and hence the question remains whether there would be any “trickling-down” to those who need structural material improvements in their lives. Already for a long time the world knows that this is not habitual. The Brazilian government in the 1970s, for one, adopted a stages strategy: “Productivismo” would have to be followed by “Distributivismo”, while finally the focus would be on “Desenvolvimento Social” (social development). Unfortunately, though, state interventions remained confined to just stage I, and in that socio-economically extremely unequal country it was only in 2002 that a president was elected with the specific purpose to carry out policies tuned to a fair distribution of income and wealth (Ignacio Lula da Silva). Correcting outcomes resulting from unfair market conditions appears to be difficult, however. Not surprisingly in that light, the term “development” is usually qualified today. Thus, we have witnessed the rise –at least on paper- of “integrated rural development”, “people-centered development”, “development from below” and “sustainable development”, while since 1990 “human development” has become the core of the widely used Human Development reports of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). But all those terms remain problematic in their lack of substantive direction to interventionists. 

Let us examine “human development” now as the current core focus of interventions in poor people’s living conditions. The term is based on Amartya Sen’s view of development as the expansion of human capabilities, defined as “the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning’s”. ​[9]​ (From a development perspective human life is seen here as a set of doings and beings called “functioning’s”.) Therefore, development cannot be limited to the satisfaction of basic needs, but it must be seen as a process “expanding substantive freedoms that people have”.​[10]​

The Human Development Report 2004 with its special theme on culture continues to build upon that connection between development and freedom. Thus, in his foreword UNDP Administrator Mark Mulloch Brown characterizes human development as “first and foremost about allowing people to lead the kind of life they choose –and providing them with the tools and opportunities to make those choices”.​[11]​ In this setting culture, too, is tuned towards freedom, emerging in the shape of “cultural liberty”.  This is defined as “the capability of people to live and be what they choose, with adequate opportunity to consider other options.”​[12]​ Hence, refocusing on cultural liberty “does not abandon the basic commitments of the human development approach. The underlying motivation continues to be to search for ways of enhancing people’s lives and the freedoms they can enjoy.”

Although few would deny that human freedom is an essential element in well-being, there remain queries concerning its socio-political interpretation. Obviously, for Sen and UNDP freedom is more than just a negative notion –to remain free from people keeping their hands on your property or in other ways interfering with your liberty-; it is also positive in the sense of opportunity. But what is the meaning of such positive freedom? Is freedom easy access to video and audio equipment, as Fukuyama once suggested? Does freedom imply not making choices that cut off other options, indeed never committing oneself? Not for Sen, in any case; he compares, for example, the person who fasts with the destitute person who is forced to starve: “the first can choose to eat well and be well nourished in a way the second cannot.”​[13]​ Yet, the implication of Sen’s notion of freedom would still seem to be a focus on earning a lot of money so that one has a wide choice of goods and services (including leisure) and can opt for many of them at the same time. In a review of Sen’s capability approach as a basis for human development, Gasper has rightly pointed to “the bondage of desire”.​[14]​ Indeed, according to Plutarch, Plato already taught that in order to be rich one would have to reduce desire; else any efforts would remain futile. Apparently, in UNDP circles this was recognized too, as the HDR 1998 with its special focus on consumption stressed that we “must aim at extending and improving consumer choices too, but in ways that promote human life”.​[15]​ 

The snag is of course that people may have different views on what precisely promotes human life apart from freedom per se. In donor circles this is resolved by stressing two side conditions for adequate interventions: an enabling environment and the need for participation and “ownership”. Accordingly, in the Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986​[16]​, article 2 (2) stresses the obligation of all human beings to “promote and protect an appropriate political, social and economic order for development”. Problematic here, as so often in UN texts, is the assumption that “the good” just would have to be promoted and protected. In the real world, however, many people face daily hardships as a result of highly adverse (disabling) environments. (We shall take this point up below.)  Participation and distribution get a place in art. 2 (3): State development policies should be based on the “active, free and meaningful participation in development [of all individuals] and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting there from.” The problem here is that apparently development, qualified in article 1 as “economic, social, cultural and political” but not anymore defined, comes first and only then participation and distribution. In fact the furthest this declaration comes to people as the primary basis for any “development” is in the term “popular participation” in article 8 (2), something states would have to encourage “in all spheres”. Finally in this connection, in respect of the currently so trendy “ownership” and “partnership” in development, the problem is that these are fictitious abstractions that do not necessarily result in up-stream development. 

Obviously, then, procedural terminology cannot eliminate the need for some ideas on the substance of development. What, in other words, is the principal good of a human being that would have to be uplifted? St Augustine believed that this couldn’t be “bodily pleasure, nor absence of pain, nor strength, nor beauty, nor whatever else is usually reckoned among the goods of the body.”​[17]​ His positive response, not surprisingly, refers to the soul’s enjoyment of itself, which is seen as a transcending reality: “The perfection of all our good things and our perfect good is God”.​[18]​ Although Quarles, whom we are honoring through this publication, might well endorse this statement, I still think that in global moral discourse transcendental reference should preferably be of a universal secular nature. Notably, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) finds its transcendental basis in human dignity. We come upon this notion not only in the preamble but also in article 1, a kind of universal secular confession: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” 

Human dignity refers to the inherent worth of each and every human being, simply as an innate consequence of human existence whether or not an individual person is herself convinced of that.​[19]​ Inherent is, indeed, the adjective used in preamble of the UDHR, meaning that human dignity is a matter of being rather than having, and hence implying that it cannot be taken away. In fact, as argued by Justice Brennan, “even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity”​[20]​. Yet, although inalienable, human dignity can be violated, by the individual himself –the drunkard, for example- as well as by others. (In the vilest criminal’s case both occur at the same time; a rapist, for instance, violates the dignity of both his victim and himself.)

Human dignity is an elusive concept, as Dworkin has pointed out​[21]​, used in different senses depending on text and context. Strikingly, in bioethical debates it appears in two roles that might as well be applied to the realm of development: as empowerment and as constraint.​[22]​ Firstly, then, humans qua persons are distinctive in having the capacity to value their own existence while making their own judgments and taking their own decisions. Development in this sense implies an uplifting of human self-reliance: empowerment in other words. Born free, in dignity and with a conscience (UDHR, article 1 [2]), people ought to be respected and protected in their individual capacities. Secondly, human dignity implies global responsibility for the elimination of structural constraints in people’s living conditions. Development as responsibility towards the elimination of constraints is an aspect we also find in Sen’s work, albeit restricted there to human freedom rather than the broader and deeper notion of human dignity.

Although one could certainly speak of personal development, political development, and cultural development, I prefer to stick to a primary socio-economic interpretation in the sense of global responsibilities towards an uplifting of people’s material well-being through human empowerment and the elimination of structural constraints to sustainable livelihoods. Naturally, that venture has to do with self-esteem, culture and religion, politics and other aspects of life, too. In terms of analysis this way of putting things avoids eclecticism while taking its starting point in daily usage. The “product” of human development as I see it here, is that it provides a socio-economic perspective in people’s lives.

But, one may wonder, wasn’t human dignity already recognized as the primary principle underlying human rights? Unquestionably, but the same applies to “human freedom” as proclaimed in UNDP’s Human Development Report 2000 (with its special focus on human rights) as being the common principle that ties human development and human rights together.​[23]​ Apart from certain difficult questions with regard to the substance of freedom that were already discussed above, my problem with the “development as freedom” approach is that liberty is just one principle of justice (to be defined as what is right to such an extent that it entails a public-political responsibility for realization, if necessary through enforcement). Other principles of justice are, for example, the value of life per se, equality in various different meanings, proportionality, and bodily integrity. These values lie behind distinct human rights. Human dignity, however, is the core principle underlying justice as such. Thus, it links three major universal responsibilities: human development, human security and human rights. In the international venture that took off with the founding of the United Nations in 1945, there was a compartmentalization in three distinct projects: international security through the Security Council, international justice through human rights standards and mechanisms for implementation, and international development through the International Financial Institutions, and the Development Agencies. The challenge today is twofold: to integrate the three separated endeavors, and to renovate each of these in conformity with their human (dignity) dimension.





Figure 1 The Golden Triangle of Human Dignity

Human development means that life becomes more than a mere struggle for daily survival, in other words that people acquire certain options in their lives: a socio-economic perspective. Human security implies protection against violence in people’s lives, and hence peace and political stability. Human rights means protection of fundamental freedoms and basic entitlements by state law, entailing a functioning state, the rule of law, and good governance. In effect, the distinct socio-economic, socio-political and socio-legal components of human dignity relate to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s four freedoms: freedom of speech and of worship, freedom from fear and freedom from want. They are, moreover, interlinked. Thus, not surprisingly, the countries at the bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI) ranking as annually published in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)’s Human Development Report (HDR) manifest significant weaknesses in human security and human rights as well. 

In figure 1 above the linkages are sketched: in order to achieve human security a socio-economic perspective (and hence a functioning economy) is required as well as good governance and the rule of law (and hence a functioning state); for the realization of human rights it is also important that people enjoy a socio-economic perspective in their lives while living in peace in a context of political stability; the latter is important for human development, too, as well as good governance based on the rule of law. In the context of our search for a development paradigm linked to global responsibility we shall now focus on the link between human development and human rights.​[24]​ 

In human rights terminology the development deficit in our world today manifests itself as structural non-implementation of economic, social and cultural rights.​[25]​ The term “structural non-implementation” entails that a response cannot generally be found in case-by-case litigation. This does not mean, however, that these rights would not have a legal content, as Sen implies in a recent speech to the Interaction Forum in Washington. “Since the concept of rights has a legal origin”, he states, “it’s useful to begin by recognizing that many of the cases in which the idea of rights is used, and often to great effect, are not matters of legal right at all, but what can broadly be called moral or ethical rights. … This applies particularly to rights that relate to development, such as the right to food or to medicine, or to some basic income.”​[26]​ Sen does acknowledge, however, that these rights have a meaning, not as “children of law” but as “parents of law” ( using a distinction made by Tom Paine). This corresponds precisely to what I have earlier exposed as the differentiation between acquired rights and declared rights.​[27]​ Indeed, human rights do not merely function as legal resources but also as political instruments in the sense of rhetorically powerful tools in processes of emancipation and transformation. But it unnecessarily weakens declared rights to depict them as “moral” as opposed to legal rights. Rights, as Grotius already pointed out, give those who hold them a contention to insist on their due as a matter of law, and, indeed,  that distinguishes them from wider ethical notions about honor or moral desert.​[28]​ But that is exactly why “moral rights” simply do not exist. Rights, as already pointed out above, signify a public-political responsibility towards enforcement, and no matter whether they have been incorporated in national legislation or not, this is always a matter of action by rights-holders first, addressing duty-bearers next, and then looking for ways and means to secure their implementation. Rights are generally action-oriented, human rights even more so, and economic, social and cultural rights most. The simple fact, however, that they have been defined as “rights” implies an essential connection with the public interest.

The problem with declared rights is that the freedoms and entitlements that they are supposed to guarantee by law, have not yet been acquired. (Many people, for example, have an internationally declared right to health but no daily access to clean water and sanitary services.) Hence, the implementation of such rights becomes a struggle, confronting the status quo of existing power relations.​[29]​ Further on in his Washington speech Sen uses a more appropriate terminolgy when he speaks of unrealized rights that are acknowledged rights, not yet fulfilled, and “not completely fulfillable without some social changes”. The social struggles required here, correspond directly to development as global responsibility. 

Naturally, development as socio-economic emancipation and societal transformation requires thorough analyses of constraints lying at the roots of the processes of acquirement failure​[30]​ that characterize human poverty. As a methodological contribution to such research and as a tribute to my colleague and friend Philip Quarles I should like to end this essay with a figure that examines acquirement as a matter of activities combined with claims.


















































The center of this figure depicts the environment in which people attempt to acquire sustainable livelihoods. In situations of structural acquirement failure these are usually highly adverse in terms of a mal-functioning economy, bad government, and serious socio-cultural constraints. Actual acquirement happens to be a matter of both activities and honored claims; in order to work the land, for example, one needs access. While a person’s activities are rooted in her capacities, claims find their basis in entitlements, i.e. legitimate access to resources and legitimate command over goods and services. Strikingly, the state appears to play a pivotal role in the whole process, in its influence on people’s capacities through provision of basic public services like health and education, in its protection of private entitlement systems, and in the way in which it directly or indirectly arranges and rearranges entitlements.
































^1	  Actually, this is the title of a poem on twisted development by Cecil Rajendra. See… 
^2	  See, for example, the introductory chapter of his book with Ananta Kumar Giri, A Moral Critique of development. In search of global responsibilities, London and New York: Routledge, 2004.
^3	  Philip Quarles van Ufford, Can we still save the charisma of development from its very applications?, Speech for the annual convention of Danish development researchers, Fau (Jutland0, Denmark, March 8, 2004 (unpublished), p. 1.
^4	  The speech that was never held is summarized in Frans Bieckmann, De wereld volgens Prins Claus, Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2004, pp. 260 ff.
^5	  As a side remark here: in the context of this critique the word “chaos” is, indeed, to be preferred to “order”, a term also used by Quarles in his attacks on development as “orderly practice”. There is nothing wrong with order as such, it is the ordered (archical) chaos –as opposed to the sustainability of life- that might worry us.
^6	  Cf note 1, p. 5.
^7	  See, for example, his essay The Devil is Pragmatic, …
^8	  “Uplifting” is the literal translation of Chitukuko, the term for development that is used in Chichewa (Malawi’s national language). Since the connotation of development is also structural, this is perhaps the most appropriate way of putting it: structural improvement in other words.
^9	  Amartya Kumar Sen, Development as Freedom, …, 1999, p.75.
^10	  Ibid., p. 297.
^11	  Human Development Report 2004, p. v.
^12	  Id., p. 4.
^13	  Sen, ibid., p.75.
^14	  Des Gasper, Is Sen’s Capability Approach an Adequate Basis for Considering Human Development?, in Review of Political Economy, Volume 14, No 4, 2002, p. 457.
^15	  Human Development Report 1998, p. 1.
^16	  Resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986.
^17	  Cited by H. Ferguson, Religious Transformation in Western Society: The End of Happiness, London and New York: Routledge, 1992, p. x.
^18	  See further Bas de Gaay Fortman and Berma Klein Goldewijk, God and the Goods. Global Economy in a Civilizational Perspective, Geneva: World Council of Churches Publications, 1998, pp. 64-66.
^19	  Cf. Matthijs de Blois, Self-Determination or Human Dignity: The Core Principle of Human Rights, in Mielle Bulterman, Aart Hendriks and Jaqueline Smith (eds), To Baehr in Our Minds: Essays on Human Rights from the Heart of the Netherlands, Utrecht: Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, 1998, p. 531. For a full discussion of human dignity as a core principle in human rights see also Berma Klein Goldewijk and Bas de Gaay Fortman, Where Needs Meet Rights. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in a New Perspective, Geneva: World Council of Churches Publications, 1999, chapter 5: Human Dignity and Humiliation.
^20	  Quoted by Stephen J. Wermiel, Law and Human Dignity: the Judicial Soul of Justice Brennan, in William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Vol. 7, December 1998, p. 232. Not surprisingly Justice Brennan saw the death penalty as “wholly inconsistent with the constitutional principle of human dignity”.
^21	  Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, …, 1993, p. 233
^22	  Cf. Roger Brownsword, Bioethics Today, Bioethics Tomorrow: Stem Cell Research and the Dignatarian Alliance, in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, Vol. 17, 2003, p. 20.
^23	  HDR 2000, p. ..
^24	  As to human security and its linkages to human development and human rights, see Bas de Gaay Fortman, The golden triangle of human dignity: Human security, human development and human rights, in Marie Muller & Bas de Gaay Fortman (eds) From warfare to welfare: Human security in a Southern African context. Assen, The Netherlands: Royal Van Gorcum, 2004, pp 5-15.
^25	  As for the human rights deficit see Bas de Gaay Fortman, Laborious Law, Inaugural Address on accepting the Chair in Political Economy of Human Rights, Utrecht University, 21 May, 2001. See also Karin Arts and Paschal Mihyo, Responding to the Human Rights Deficit. Essays in Honour of Bas de Gaay Fortman, The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer International, 2003.
^26	  Amartya Sen, Operating in an Age of Uncertainty: New Challenges in Humanitarian and Development Work, Address to the Interaction Forum, Washington, May 19, 2004.
^27	  See my Laborious Law, note 25.
^28	  See Jeremy Rabkin, Law and Human Dignity, in Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 27, Fall 2003, pp. 149-150, and notes 16 and 17.
^29	  See Goldewijk & Fortman, above, note 19, chapter 9: Legitimacy versus legality.
^30	  Sen speaks of the “acquirement problem”, defining acquirement as the practice of getting access to the necessary resources and acquiring the goods and services needed. See Bas de Gaay Fortman, Beyond Income Distribution. An Entitlement Systems Approach to the Acquirement Problem, in J. van der Linden et al. (eds), The Economics of Income Distribution: Heterodox Approaches, Edward Elgar, Brookfield (UK)/Cheltenham (US),), 1999, p. 31.
